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GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING: COMPROMISES BY
PROSECUTORS TO SECURE GUILTY PLEAS
The widely held view that prosecutors never bargain is a myth.
As a practical matter they must in order to stay in business1
The guilty plea has become an important factor in the administration
of American criminal law.2 Guilty pleas are prevalent in the state courts,3
and in the federal courts pleas of nolo contendere and guilty pleas represent
an average of 79 percent of the dispositions of all criminal defendants for
the fiscal years 1956 through 1962. The commonplace practice of "plea
bargaining" 5-- compromises by prosecuting attorneys with criminal de-
1 Polstein, How To "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAv. 35, 37 (1962).
2 See SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRImINOLOGY 390-91 (7th ed.
1960) ; 2 PLosCowE, MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 415-17 (1956); Breitel,
Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHL L. R v. 427, 432 (1960) ; Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. Cm . L.,
C. & P.S. 780 (1956) ; Polstein, supra note 1, at 35.
3 See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1962 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, Table XIV, Fiscal year 1961-1962
(70.2% of criminal dispositions are before trial); N.J. ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE CoURTs ANN. REP., Table U-Law Divisions of the Superior and County Courts
(Sept. 1, 1960, to Aug. 31, 1961) (57.1% of indictments and accusations closed during
period were by plea); SCHWARTZ, CASES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27 (1961); PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 318; Appendix, question 1, infra.
4 DIRECToR oF ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP.
For the last seven fiscal years ending respectively June 30, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959,
1960, 1961, 1962, see Table D4 in each Report. The figures for 1956-1960 are derived
from dispositions in 86 district courts; in 1961, 90 district court dispositions were
analyzed, and in 1962, 87. The figures are representative of all criminal offenses
except juvenile delinquency.
5 See authorities cited note 2 supra; PUTTEAMmER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW 169-72 (1953) ; Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRmI.
L., C. & P.S. 770, 786 (1933); Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1927); Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 506 (1941-42); Appendix, question 2, infra. The practice has
not been limited to the United States. See HowARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND
320-25 (1931).
Some prosecuting attorneys object to the use of the phrase "plea bargaining."
One prosecutor indicated that "by labeling the procedure 'plea bargaining' you tend
to make the procedure sound unethical and improper." Questionnaire Reply From
State Prosecutor, November 1963.
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fendants or their counsel to obtain guilty pleas-is in part responsible for
the high incidence of such pleas.6
I. DESCRIPTION OF PLEA BARGAINING
A. Typical Plea Arrangements
There is a broad range of plea arrangements currently used by pros-
ecutors. The three most common are the sentence recommendation, the
plea to a lesser included offense, and the dismissal of charges in an indict-
ment, information, or other charging paper.7
Under the sentence recommendation practice, the prosecuting attorney
promises that he will recommend to the court a sentence favorable to the
defendant, will not seek the maximum penalty, or will refrain from making
any recommendations. Most often the sentence recommendation involves
a promise by the prosecutor to suggest to the trial judge a mutually satis-
factory term of years as the appropriate punishment in return for a defend-
ant's guilty plea. In order for the practice to have any value to defendants
and prosecutors there must be a reasonable expectation of judicial accept-
ance of the recommendations. Where there is a judicial practice of follow-
ing recommendations, the promise of a recommended sentence can be tanta-
mount to a promise of a definite term. But each defendant who pleads
guilty in reliance on a prosecutor's promise to recommend a specific sentence
takes the risk that in his particular case the judge will not follow the
suggestion in imposing sentence.8 In addition, many defendants may enter
into agreements with prosecutors to avoid imposition of the maximum
sentence, but, unless they are informed of actual sentencing patterns, may
needlessly bargain away their right to trial since sentences often fall con-
siderably below the maximums provided by the legislatures.9
6 See Appendix, question 5, infra.
7 For an indication of the incidence of each type of arrangement see Appendix,
question 3, infra. Many other types of agreements are made with defendants to
induce a plea. These include promises not to prosecute codefendants, promises to
arrange for the defendant or a codefendant to be incarcerated in a particular prison,
promises to have the defendant or a codefendant tried in the juvenile court, recom-
mendations for presentence investigations, recommendations for concurrent sentences,
and agreements not to oppose probation. Promises of immunity by the prosecutor
can also be used to induce guilty pleas. Immunity can be promised with respect to
some crimes in order to obtain a plea on another crime. Technically, immunity
promises could come within the scope of a promise to dismiss charges in an indict-
ment, but often the immunity relates to crimes not yet charged.
8 Cf. State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 309, 380 P.2d 604, 606 (1963) : "That there
apparently was a 'bargaining for pleas' between defendant and the county attorney
in amending the original information and answer does not in and of itself prove that
a lesser sentence would tend to rehabilitate the defendant."
9 It is possible to draw this inference from the following set of statistics. The
statistics do not reveal the number of offenses on which each prisoner was sentenced,
nor do they indicate whether the release was by way of parole or termination of
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In some jurisdictions the prosecutor may recommend that the court
accept a guilty plea to a lesser offense included in the offense actually
charged. The court's permission to plead to a lesser included offense is
usually required, and in some jurisdictions the prosecutor must file rea-
sons for recommending the lesser plea. New York has a statutory provi-
sion explicitly permitting the practice:
sentence. The short periods of incarceration before release, however, are some indi-
cation that the sentences imposed were markedly below the maximums provided.
STATUTORY PENALTY- TIME SERVED BY FELONY PRISONERS
STATE & CR1I FIRST OFFENSE BEFORE FIRST RELEASE-1953
Months Served
Number of Months -Range of
Offenders Served- Middle 80%
Released Median Released
New Jersey
Burglary 84 months (maximum) 264 21 10- 55
Robbery 180 months (maximum) 154 26 11- 88
Forgery 84 months (maximum) 29 17 9- 33
New York
Burglary First Degree-
120-360 months
Second Degree-
180 months (maximum)
Third Degree-
120 months (maximum)
Robbery First Degree-
120-360 months
Second Degree-
180 months (maximum)
Third Degree-
120 months (maximum)
Forgery First Degree-
240 months (maximum)
Second Degree-
120 months (maximum)
Third Degree-
60 months (maximum)
553 32 17- 77
614 40 18-127
94 31 13- 60
Pennsylvania
Burglary 240 months (maximum) 484 30 15- 75
Robbery 120 months (maximum) 290 49 19-122
Forgery 120 months (maximum) 37 31 18- 60
Sources: FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS-PRISONERS
RELEASED FROM STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS: 1952-1953, at 103, 107, 119
(tables 39B, 41B, 47B); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:85-6 (high misdemeanor penalty),
2A:94-1 (burglary), 2A:109-1 (forgery), 2A:141-1 (robbery) (1953); N.Y. PEN.
LAW §§ 407 (burglary), 886 (first degree forgery), 888 (second degree forgery), 893
(third degree forgery), 2125 (first degree robbery), 2127 (second degree robbery),
2129 (third degree robbery); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4704 (robbery), 4901 (bur-
glary), 5014 (forgery) (1963).
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In any case where the court, upon the recommendation of the
district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, accepts a plea of
guilty to a crime or offense of a lesser degree or for which a
lesser punishment is prescribed than the crime or offense charged,
it shall be the duty of the district attorney to submit to the court a
statement in writing in which his reasons for recommending the
acceptance of such plea shall be clearly set forth.10
In New York some of the most common reasons submitted by the district
attorneys have been difficulty in proving the indictment, mitigation of harsh
penalties, unreliability of state's witnesses, conflicting evidence, reluctant
complainant, lack of adequate identification, and lack of corroboration,"
The prosecutor may also offer to dismiss certain criminal allegations
in the charging papers in order to induce a defendant to plead guilty to the
remaining charges. This procedure calls for the defendant to plead guilty
to the charges agreed upon and for the prosecutor, at the time set aside
by the court for dismissals, to move for dismissal of the remaining charges.
The court's approval is usually required for the dismissal of any charges,'
2
and ordinarily charges are dismissed as a matter of course.' 3
The charge dismissal practice developed as a possible plea bargaining
tool because of the multiplicity of crimes which often arise out of a single
incident.14 However, an apparently advantageous bargain may actually be
specious because of the tendency of many courts to sentence concurrently,
or to suspend sentence on all but one or two of the multiple and similar
charges arising out of the same incident.15
10 N.Y. CODE CPJ.. PROC. § 342-a. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-60
(1958):
Whenever any indictment, information or complaint is pending before
any court, a conviction may be had for any offense sufficiently alleged therein
or for an attempt to commit such offense, and the accused may be convicted
or such court may accept a plea of guilty for any of such offenses.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 628.32, 630.30 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-14-17 (1960);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-8 (1953).
11 See Weintraub & Tough, supra note 5, at 507-08. See generally PLOSCOWE,
op. cit. mipra note 2, at 417-21. A significant reason which may not be apparent
from the records is probably the time and cost savings involved in disposing of cases
by guilty plea.
1
2 See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.510 (1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 815
(1958).
13 See THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
79 (Blackburn ed. 1935) ; PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 328; CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND 144 (Pound & Frankfurter eds. 1922).
'4 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959) (possession of unstamped
heroin package sufficient proof for conviction of two independent crimes because of
different statutory presumptions) ; Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (single
transaction of selling narcotics involved violation of three distinct offenses). "[T]he
usual armed robbery indictment in New York includes four counts-robbery in the
first degree (10 to 30 years), assault in the first degree (up to 10 years), grand
larceny in the first degree (up to 10 years), and an unlawful weapon count, as either
a felony (up to seven years), or as a misdemeanor (maximum sentence of indeter-
minate term up to three years)." Polstein, supra note 1, at 38.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Domroe, 129 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1942) (imposition
of sentence suspended on all but one count).
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B. Judicial Consideration of a Guilty Plea in Determining Sentence
Four prominent judicial views have been expressed recently concerning
the proper sentence for a defendant who has pleaded guilty as opposed to
one who is found guilty following a trial on the merits. One theory is that
"the willingness [of a defendant] to plead guilty ought not to have any
independent significance in sentencing." 16 Judges expressing this view
consider it unethical for a court generally to treat guilty-pleading defend-
ants more leniently since this judicial practice would tend to create pressure
on defendants to forego their right to trial. Another view is that although
the guilty plea should have no independent significance in sentencing, a
defendant who proceeds to trial and puts up a seemingly contrived defense
should be treated more severely than one admitting his guilt.1
7 The premise
of this theory is that such a defendant has not demonstrated a sincere inter-
est in rehabilitation. The theory, at least indirectly, encourages the guilty
plea. Still another view is that more lenient treatment should be accorded
defendants who enter guilty pleas.'8 The underlying rationales advanced
for this view are that the admission of guilt is the first step towards re-
16Pilot Institute on Sentencing, Proceedings, 26 F.R.D. 231, 285 (1959) [herein-
after cited as Pilot Institute]. See generally Note, The Influence of the Defendant's
Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
17 Pilot Institute 287.
's Pilot Institute 287-88. In Dewey v. United States, 268 F.2d 124, 128 (8th
Cir. 1959), the court took judicial notice that more lenient sentences are imposed
on defendants who plead guilty. See Commonwealth v. Kennan, 179 Pa. Super. 145,
115 A.2d 386 (1955) ; Appendix, question 15, infra.
United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960), provides an interesting
judicial dialogue between a district court and a court of appeals about sentencing
after a guilty plea. Wiley, one of five defendants charged with having stolen goods
in their possession while moving in interstate commerce, elected to stand trial before
a judge; the other four defendants, one of whom was the ringleader, pleaded guilty
and received sentences ranging from a year and a day to two years. Wiley received
a three-year sentence. Before imposing sentence on Wiley, the trial judge responded
to defense counsel's plea for leniency:
In view of the fact that the trial was expedited by waiving a jury and
by stipulation of the various items that expedited the proof I make the sen-
tence less than I otherwise would. . . . Had there been a plea of guilty
in this case probably probation might have been considered under certain
terms, but you are all well aware of the standing policy here that once a
defendant stands trial that element of grace is removed from the considera-
tion of the Court in the imposition of sentence.
Id. at 681. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but the case remanded for re-
consideration of the sentence because of the trial judge's remarks about probation.
United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959). Again, a three-year sentence
was imposed, but this time the court of appeals reversed, holding that there was an
abuse of discretion in singling out Wiley by giving him a more severe sentence than
the others. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). On remand, the
district court again imposed a three-year sentence but suspended its execution. 184
F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960). In explaining his views on sentencing, the trial judge
said that the "overwhelming volume of criminal cases" and the time and expense
saved through guilty pleas, dictated such a policy of treating defendants who plead
guilty more leniently. He also considered that pleading guilty demonstrated the
defendant's first step towards reformation. Id. at 685. Compare Gillespie v. State,
355 P.2d 451, 456 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) : "A policy designed to deny defendant
a suspended sentence solely because he demanded a jury trial is contrary to law and
an unjustifiable denial of defendant's rights to have his application for a suspended
sentence considered upon its merits."
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habilitation and that guilty pleas permit an efficient administration of crim-
inal justice. Finally, there is the theory that the rehabilitation concept
should be considered in terms of the particular crime charged. 19 If it is
generally difficult to obtain a conviction for certain crimes, for example,
income tax violations, and the defendant has pleaded guilty, deciding not
to gamble with a trial, it is asserted that he should receive consideration for
so doing.
Some judges without a preformulated theory may impose different
sentences, consciously or unconsciously, depending on whether there was a
trial. Sentencing after trial may be influenced by the vividness of the facts
portrayed during the trial, by emotional reaction to those facts, and by the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's case.20 Similar influences are
less likely to be operative in the guilty plea context.
C. Current Rules Governing Guilty Pleas
There has been a growing recognition by courts of the existence and
pervasiveness of plea bargaining.2 ' To a still indefinite extent the practice
has received official sanction. In Barber v. Gladden, a federal district court
said:
These are commonplace occurrences [pleas of guilty to lesser
included offenses] in courts throughout the country. We do it in
the Federal District Court. On multiple count indictments, we
often accept pleas of guilty to one or two counts . . . . In many
courts, particularly State courts, a defendant's lawyer and the
prosecutor may bargain not only on the offense, but also on the
length of the sentence which the prosecutor will recommend.
It is an integral part of the administration of justice in the
United States
22
In Anderson v. North Carolina, the district court specifically assumed the
"constitutional validity of the time-honored compromise plea" in deter-
19 Pilot Institute 288.
20 These considerations would not necessarily apply if a different judge imposes
sentence. However, the judge who presides at trial usually imposes sentence. Cf.
5 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 2177 (12th ed. 1957); Polstein, supra
note 1, at 41.
21 See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Anderson v. North
Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C 1963); Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308
(D. Ore. 1963); State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 380 P.2d 604 (1963); People v.
Woltz, 35 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ; Hinckle v. State, 189 A.2d 432 (Del.
1963) ; Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 73 AtI. 637 (1909) ; Lizotte v. Dioska, 200 Mass.
327, 86 N.E. 774 (1909) ; People v. Bannon, 364 Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961) ;
State v. Civella, 364 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d
511, 166 N.E.2d 680, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1960); People v. Guiden, 5 App. Div. 2d
975, 172 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1958); Maxwell v. State, 292 P.2d 181 (Okla. Crim. App.
1956) ; State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963). But see State v. Nance,
120 Mont. 152, 184 P.2d 554 (1947) ; State v. Ashby, 81 N.J. Super. 350, 195 A.2d
635 (App. Div. 1963).
2 Barber v. Gladden, mspra note 21, at 314.
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mining that the defendant lacked effective representation since he was
without legal assistance in negotiating the plea arrangement.2 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Michigan has taken judicial notice of the prevalence
of plea bargaining in that state.24
Judicial recognition has probably spurred an increase in plea bargain-
ing activity and thereby multiplied the number of guilty pleas.&2 5 Legal safe-
guards have developed for defendants who plead guilty, whether or not the
pleas are the result of bargaining. The general standard for accepting a
guilty plea has been articulated in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
A defendant may plead . . . guilty or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge.26
1. Voluntariness
A conviction founded on an involuntary guilty plea is constitutionally
void and may be collaterally attacked; coercion, whether mental or physical,
vitiates voluntariness. 27 A guilty plea is tantamount to a conviction; once
the plea is validly accepted by the court, the defendant has waived all the
constitutional, statutory, and judicially created safeguards afforded him for
a trial determination of guilt; the imposition of sentence is the only judicial
action remaining. 3 Courts, therefore, have a constitutional obligation to
23221 F. Supp. 930, 934 (W.D.N.C. 1963). (Footnote omitted.)
24 People v. Bannon, 364 Mich. 471, 475, 110 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1961). In People
v. Guiden, 5 App. Div. 2d 975, 976, 172 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (1958), the court said,
"the acceptance of pleas of guilty to lesser offenses with consequent lighter sentences
is perfectly appropriate where the proper and efficient administration of justice will
best be served thereby." The Delaware Supreme Court remarked in Hinckle v. State,
189 A.2d 432, 435 (Del. 1963), "we have no doubt, efficiency in administering the
criminal laws oftentimes makes it desirable for the State to accept pleas to lesser
offenses."
25 See Weintraub & Tough, supra note 5, at 506.
26 (Emphasis added.) For similar requirements in state courts see, e.g., COLO.
R. CRIm. P. 11A; DEL. Supaa. CT. (CaUM.) R. 11; ILL. SUP. CT. (Caim.) R. 26(3);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.1058 (1954); Mo. SUP. CT. (Caim.) R. 25.04; N.J. RULES
(Cams.) 8:4-3; TEx. CODE CRIm. P. art. 501 (Supp. 1963) ; State v. La Porta, 140
Conn. 610, 102 A.2d 885 (1954) ; Ward v. State, 156 Fla. 185, 22 So. 2d 887 (1945) ;
Rowland v. State, 72 Ga. App. 793, 35 S.E.2d 372 (1945); State v. Killison, 232
Iowa 9, 4 N.W.2d 239 (1942); Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P.2d 147
(1948) ; Case v. State, 228 Md. 551, 180 A.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1962) ; State v. Fer-
ranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 148 N.E. 362 (1925) ; Application of Kinnison, 335 P.2d 645
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959); State v. Sewell, 69 S.D. 494, 12 N.W.2d 198 (1943);
State v. McLaughlin, 59 Wash. 2d 865, 371 P.2d 55 (1962).
27 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ; see Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (dictum); United States ex rel. McGrath
v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180
(3d Cir. 1963) (dictum); United States ex reL. Perpiglia v. Rundle, 221 F. Supp.
1003 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
28Machibroda v. United States, supra note 27, at 493; Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
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determine that a plea is voluntary before it is accepted as the basis of a
conviction,2 9 but no particular procedure need be followed in making this
determination 3° and no clear definition of "voluntariness" has been
formulated.38
There has never been an explicit indication by the courts that a guilty
plea induced by a prosecutor's promise is involuntary. In Machibroda v.
United States, the Supreme Court said that "a guilty plea, if induced by
promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act,
is void." 8 2 The Court remanded for a hearing on the defendant's allega-
tions that the Assistant United States Attorney had promised defendant
a more lenient sentence than was actually imposed and instructed him that
if he told his attorney about the arrangement he would risk entry of addi-
tional charges. If the allegations were true, the government attorney had
entered into a plea arrangement which he was unable to fulfill and deprived
the defendant of the full effectiveness of his counsel. Machibroda, there-
fore, sheds little light on whether "honorable" plea arrangements are
permissible.
Shelton v. United States-3 3 dealt directly with this question and split
the Fifth Circuit. Shelton had pleaded guilty to transporting a stolen
vehicle between states and received a one year prison term. Subsequently,
he brought a motion to vacate the conviction on the ground that his plea
was not voluntary, having been induced by prosecution promises. 3 4  The
district court denied the motion because it found that Shelton's plea was
made with full understanding of the commitments made to him and that
all the promises were kept.3 5 In an en banc rehearing the majority affirmed
the district court and devised a definition of voluntariness:
29 See cases cited note 27 supra.
30 Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579, 580 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
991 (1961).
31 See text accompanying notes 111-29 infra.
32 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
3 242 F.2d 101, rev'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc),
rev'd on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam).
34 The motion papers detailed the following promises and conditions:
"(1) government counsel's promise to arrange for dismissal of all other
federal charges, (2) . . . 'guarantee' of a sentence of not more than one
year . . . (3) . . . threat that it would take defendant longer to get tried
on the other pending charges than it would take him to serve a one year
sentence, and (4) defendant's confused, anxious, desperate, and incompetent
state of mind resulting from prolonged confinement in county jails while
awaiting trial as aforesaid."
242 F.2d at 102 n.1.
35 On appeal from the district court's denial of Shelton's motion the three-judge
panel reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the plea was voluntarily
entered. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957). The majority
opinion, without explicitly articulating the requirements of a voluntary plea, simply
stated that a guilty plea given in reliance on a government promise must be voluntary
and not induced by the promise. The dissent vigorously argued that a plea of guilty
was not "subject to impeachment merely because it had been induced by a promise
of recommended leniency." Id. at 113. On rehearing en banc the panel dissenter
wrote the majority opinion.
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[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct con-
sequences, including the actual value of any commitments made
to him by the court, prosecutor or his own counsel, must stand
unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unful-
fillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's
business (e.g., bribes).36
The dissenters at the rehearing argued that a guilty plea should be
subject to the same "rigorous tests" of trustworthiness applicable to con-
fessions 7 They were wary that innocent defendants might be induced
to plead guilty by promises of leniency: "[T] he sole inquiry should remain,
was the plea of guilty made under such circumstances as to constitute it
reliable and trustworthy evidence of the accused's guilt of the offense with
which he was charged." 38 The Supreme Court reversed per curiam on
an unexplained confession of error by the Solicitor General 3 9 The basic
question therefore remains undecided. Subsequent cases considering the
issue have assumed that a prosecutor's promise does not necessarily affect
the voluntary character of a guilty plea. For example, in Martin v. United
States, the Fifth Circuit again held that the mere presence of a plea ar-
rangement did not make the plea involuntary if it was freely entered by the
defendant with an awareness of all the relevant facts and the assistance of
competent counsel. °
2. Understanding
It is difficult to determine where the concept of voluntariness ends and
understanding begins, but for analytical purposes the two can be treated-
separately. To be effective, waiver of basic constitutional rights must be
made with understanding.4 1 "[R]eal notice of the true nature of the
charge . . [is] the first and most universally recognized requirement of
36246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane majority).
37 See text accompanying notes 114-24 infra.
38 246 F.2d at 580 (en bane dissent).
39 "Upon consideration of the entire record and confession of error by the
Solicitor General that the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the
judgment .. .is reversed . . ." 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam).
40256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 921 (1958). The court declared
that the Shelton dissent did not become law by virtue of the Supreme Court's reversal.
Martin has apparently been followed. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180
(3d Cir. 1963) (court by-passed voluntariness question) ; Sorrenti v. United States,
306 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 916 (1963); Watts v. United
States, 278 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st
Cir. 1959) ; Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 934 n.5 (W.D.N.C. 1963)
(court assumed constitutionality of bargained plea).
41 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-65 (1938) ; Kadwell v. United States,
315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.
1963); People v. Washington, 5 Ill. 2d 58, 124 N.E.2d 890 (1955); Goff v. State,
240 Ind. 267, 163 N.E.2d 888 (1960).
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due process . "...1, 42 Many jurisdictions follow the rule that the word-
ing of the charging papers is sufficient to bring to a defendant's attention
the crime to which he is pleading.43  If a defendant is represented by
counsel, there may be no need for a judge to go beyond the wording of the
statute, since counsel can be expected to have explained the charge.44 But
the mere presence of counsel does not relieve the court from making a de-
termination that the plea itself is understandingly made.45  Assistance of
counsel will not preclude a defendant from subsequently asserting that he
did not comprehend the nature of the charge, especially when the proceed-
ing itself is confusing.46
Except for a general consensus that the defendant must understand the
crime of which he is charged, courts disagree on whether other subjects of
understanding are required. The Ninth Circuit has recently stated that
for purposes of Rule 11 the trial court must satisfy itself that the defendant
understood "the meaning of the charge, and what acts amount to being
guilty of the charge, and the consequences of pleading guilty thereto." 47
But there is a division of authority on whether understanding of the con-
sequences of a guilty plea includes knowledge of the range of possible pun-
ishment.48 The cases which indicate that the defendant need not be aware
42 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
43 See, e.g., Mora v. United States, 317 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1963); People v.
Doyle, 20 I1l. 2d 163, 169 N.E.2d 250 (1960) ; Parker v. State, 189 Ind. 85, 125 N.E.
772 (1920) ; Johnson v. State, 223 Md. 479, 164 A.2d 917 (1960). The wording of
the indictment may not always be accurate, People v. Englese, 7 N.Y.2d 83, 163 N.E.2d
869, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959) (indictment falsely labeled offense as felony), nor are
the explanations of the charges always correct, People v. Schoonover, 15 App. Div.
2d 862, 225 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1962) (defendant falsely informed offense was misde-
meanor).
44 See People v. Doyle, 20 Ill. 2d 163, 169 N.E.2d 250 (1960); cf. People v.
Loeber, 158 Cal. App. 2d 730, 323 P.2d 136 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ; People v. Water-
man, 8 App. Div. 2d 920, 187 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1959) (memorandum decision) ; State v.
Sawyer, 380 P.2d 726 (Wash. 1963).
45 United States v. Diggs, 304 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Davis,
212 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954).
41 See United States v. Davis, supra note 45. There the defendant was charged
with three separate violations of the federal narcotic laws; he pleaded guilty to the
two substantive violations, and the conspiracy charge was dismissed. Subsequently
he moved to vacate the judgment on one of the substantive indictments on the ground
that he thought he had pleaded to the conspiracy charge. The court ordered a hearing
on whether the defendant had the requisite understanding: the record "does not show
that the indictment was read aloud nor the substance of its contents stated in the
defendant's presence" and "he was not asked whether he understood with what he
was charged . . . ." Id. at 267; accord, Ellis v. United States, 313 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1963) (perplexing references by the court).
47 Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1963). The Kadwell
case involved a motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea before sentence was imposed,
but the court relied for its proposition on Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958), in which the motion for withdrawal
was made after sentence.
48 Compare Kadwell v. United States, supra note 47, and Pilkington v. United
States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963), and State v. Smith, 66 Ariz. 376, 189 P.2d 205
(1948), and Vanderhoof v. People, 380 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1963) (en banc), and Krolage
v. People, 224 Ill. 456, 79 N.E. 570 (1906), with United States v. Searle, 180 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1950), and State v. Florence, 23 Conn. Supp. 176, 178 A.2d 862 (Cir.
Ct. 1961) (noncapital offenses), and Boggess v. Briers, 134 W. Va. 370, 59 S.E.2d
480 (1950).
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of the range of punishment appear to hedge the question by concluding that
in any event the defendant had such knowledge. 49 The Fifth Circuit, in
Twining v. United States,50 held that where the defendant had an awareness
of the severity of the crime charged and some idea of the possible penalty,
he had sufficient understanding to plead guilty. In Pilkington v. United
States,51 a case involving the Federal Youth Corrections Act, the court
ordered a hearing on defendant's allegations that after he was advised that
the maximum sentence was five years he received an indeterminate term of
one to six years.
The most immediate penal consequence of a guilty plea is the im-
position of sentence on the charge to which the defendant pleaded. This
sentence, however, may not be the only penalty imposed; many jurisdictions
have enacted multiple offender laws which require or permit imposition of
another or a more severe penalty if the defendant has been previously con-
victed of felonies . 2 Since in these circumstances the period of incarceration
imposed on a defendant can be greater than the maximum sentence provided
for the actual offense to which he pleads guilty, some courts require that
the defendant be informed of the existence of such a statute and the pos-
sibility that it may increase his sentence on the present conviction. 53
Courts have not considered it necessary to inform the defendant of
possible collateral consequences when such consequences result from sub-
sequent criminal convictions of the defendant or do not relate directly to
the charge to which the defendant pleads guilty.5 There is no obligation
to inform a defendant that the conviction of the present crime will be
considered under a multiple offender law if he should be convicted of another
crime.r 5 Similarly, there is no obligation to tell a defendant that in the
event of any subsequent convictions the present conviction could be con-
sidered in determining whether to give a lenient or severe penalty on the
subsequent conviction,5 6 or that society generally discriminates against con-
victed offenders.5 7  Nor need a court inform a defendant that conviction
can mean deportation,5 8 court martial from the armed services,
59 loss of the
49 See United States v. Searle, supra note 48, at 211; Boggess v. Briers, supra
note 48, at 377, 59 S.E.2d at 484.
50 321 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1963).
51315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963).
52 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :85-8 to 85-9 (Supp. 1963) ; N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 510.
53 See N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC § 335-b; People v. Schulman, 13 App. Div. 2d
441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1961) ; cf. Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir.
1953).
54 See generally Note, Civil Consequences of Conviction for a Felony, 12 DRAYE
L. REv. 141 (1962).
55 Cf. Fee v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Va. 1962).
56 See ibid.
57 Cf. State v. Florence, 23 Conn. Supp. 176, 178 A.2d 862 (Cir. Ct. 1961).
58 See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
840 (1954).
59 See Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
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right to vote, 0 or loss of the right to operate a business licensed by the
state.61 It also does not seem that the defendant must know what re-
habilitation programs will be available to him.
62
3. Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas
A guilty plea which is not voluntary and made with an understanding
of the nature of the charge may be withdrawn at any time, and the judg-
ment vacated or set aside.3 On the other hand, if the ground for with-
drawal is other than on constitutional issues, as for example, where the
defendant had unfounded hopes for a less severe sentence, the general rule
has evolved that withdrawal comes within the sound discretion of the trial
judge.'" At least one state provides for withdrawal as of right before sen-
tence is imposed,65 and most states recognize that the trial judge's dis-
cretion should be exercised liberally in favor of permitting withdrawal on
motion by the defendant prior to the imposition of sentence.6 6 Rule 32(d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has become the model rule of
procedure for some states:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made
only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is sus-
60 See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963) (alternative
holding).
61 Compare State v. Bowser, 155 Kan. 723, 129 P.2d 268 (1942) (funeral
director's license).
62 It will not be suggested by anybody that, before accepting a plea of guilty
to an offense with respect to which parole is a possibility, the judge must
determine whether the defendant understands the nature of parole, his eligi-
bility therefor, and the circumstances in which it may thereafter be granted.
The reason is, of course, that eligibility for parole is not a "consequence"
of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace.
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Defendants, however, often consider the type of program available as an impor-
tant factor in the decision to plead guilty. Probation or parole promises were in-
volved in People v. Tidwell, 75 Cal. App. 2d 476, 171 P.2d 565 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946) ;
People v. Byzon, 267 Ill. 498, 108 N.E. 685 (1915); Leonard v. Barnes, 280 App.
Div. 1, 111 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1952). Importance has even been placed by some defend-
ants on the place of incarceration. See People v. Outten, 22 Ill. 2d 146, 174 N.E.2d
685 (1961).
63 See cases cited note 27 supra. See generally, Note, Withdrawal of Guilty
Pleas in the Federal Courts, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 366 (1955); Note, Withdrawal of
Guilty Pleas Under Rule 32(d), 64 YALE L.J. 590 (1955).
64 See, e.g., State v. Norgard, 92 Ariz. 313, 376 P.2d 776 (1962) (defendant
merely changed his mind); People v. Schmidt, 10 Ill. 2d 221, 139 N.E.2d 726 (1957)
(disappointment with sentence); State v. Downs, 185 Kan. 168, 341 P.2d 957 (1959)
(disappointment with sentence); Coan v. Hilton, 91 N.H. 489, 23 A.2d 369 (1941)
(no facts to support withdrawal) ; Jones v. State, 349 P.2d 41 (Okla. Crim. 1960)
(defendant confused but no finding of involuntariness) ; Commonwealth v. Sablowsky,
150 Pa. Super. 231, 27 A.2d 443 (1942) (technical objections to indictments) ; State
v. Crowse, 69 Wyo. 85, 237 P.2d 481 (1951) (disappointment with sentence); cf.
State v. Pometti, 12 N.J. 446, 97 A.2d 399 (1953) (disappointment with sentence;
plea of nolo contendere).
65 See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1404 (1953), McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887, 889,
114 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1960) (dictum).
66 See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 353, 220 S.W.2d 846 (1949);
People v. Case, 340 Mich. 526, 65 N.W.2d 803 (1954).
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pended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea.
67
But the rule offers little practical help to the courts in deciding individual
cases except to indicate that the test for withdrawal is more stringent after
sentence than before.
If a defendant's guilty plea was given in reliance upon an improper
or unfulfilled promise of the prosecutor, courts have generally permitted
withdrawal of the plea even after imposition of sentence.65 Dillon v. United
States suggested that a prosecutor's failure to comply with his promise
would violate due process.69 If a prosecutor has no basis for believing that
his promise of a sentence recommendation will be taken into consideration
by the judge, and yet induces a guilty plea by promising a certain recom-
mendation, his promise is illusory, and if the defendant is prejudiced thereby
he may withdraw his plea.7" Similarly, withdrawal is permitted if the
recommendation is to be given only if the trial judge asks for the pros-
ecutor's opinion, and the prosecutor makes the arrangement knowing the
judge never requests such opinions.71 Where withdrawal has been per-
mitted because of a broken promise, the defendant has generally been
permitted to replead.72 In Oklahoma, however, it is the practice of the
courts either to modify the sentence in accordance with the promise or to
modify it as the courts see fit.73
Some jurisdictions require an allegation of innocence before a court
will grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.74 Courts also require a
6 7 Compare DEL. Su ER. CT. (CRam.) R. 32(d); N.J. RULES (CRIm.) 3:7-10(a).
68 See Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); State v. Hovis,
353 Mo. 602, 183 S.W.2d 147 (1944); cf. United States v. Graham, 325 F.2d 922
(6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Schneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
69 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) ; see Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E2d
425 (1943); People ex rel. Hunt v. Warden, 201 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 136
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
70 Cf. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
71 Ibid.
7 2 See McKeag v. People, 7 Il1. 2d 586, 131 N.E.2d 517 (1956) ; East v. State,
89 Ind. App. 701, 168 N.E. 28 (1929) ; State v. Hovis, 353 Mo. 602, 183 S.W.2d 147
(1944); People v. Pagano, 283 App. Div. 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1954); Com-
monwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174 (1958).
73 See Courtney v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959); Harjo v.
State, 70 Okla. Crim. 369, 106 P.2d 527 (1940). In United States v. Graham, 325
F.2d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 1963), the court gave the defendant the option of being
sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement or to withdraw his nolo contendere
plea and enter a plea of not guilty.
74 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Paglia,
190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951), overruled on other grounds sub norn. United States v.
Taylor, 217 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Cooper, 222 F. Supp. 661, 663
(D.D.C. 1963); People v. Wheeler, 349 Ill. 230, 181 N.E. 623 (1932); State v.
Nichols, 167 Kan. 565, 307 P.2d 469 (1949). In Paglia, Judge Learned Hand made
the often-quoted statement, "justice is not a game; there is no constitutional right
to 'throw dust in a juryman's eyes or hoodwink a judge who is not overwise!."
190 F.2d at 447-48.
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showing of reliance to support a claim of harm from a prosecutor's induce-
ment.7 5 An inference of nonreliance may be drawn from a defendant's
statements at the time of sentencing,7 6 by entry of a guilty plea despite the
prosecutor's announcement prior to the time defendant must plead that the
bargain will not be honored,7 7 or by the failure of the defendant or his
attorney to speak out at the sentencing hearing when it becomes apparent
that the prosecutor has not kept his part of the agreement.7 8 Defendant's
intelligence and experience with the criminal courts 79 and his diligence in
raising the claim of an improper or dishonored promise 8 0 are additional
factors bearing on the issue of reliance. A long time lapse between sentence
and collateral attack tends to negate any reliance on a plea arrangement and
the veracity of the allegation that a promise was made.81 Finally, if the
defendant was represented by counsel, allegations that the prosecutor prom-
ised a definite sentence disposition have been considered insufficient for
withdrawal since the defendant is assumed to have known of the inde-
pendence of the functions of the court and prosecutor.
8 2
II. AN APPRAISAL OF PLEA BARGAINING
A. Propriety of the Practice
Plea bargaining has been castigated as unethical and contrary to Anglo-
American notions of criminal justice.8 3 One argument is that the practice
intrudes on society's interests either by limiting the range of punishment
which the judiciary may utilize in setting sentences, or, in those jurisdictions
75 See, e.g., People v. Ensor, 319 Ill. 255, 149 N.E. 737 (1925) (semble) ; State
v. Myers, 241 Iowa 670, 42 N.W.2d 79 (1950).
76 See Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961) ; cf. State v. Downs,
185 Kan. 168, 341 P2d 957 (1959).
77 See Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1956).
78 See United States v. Davis, 319 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1963); Bryant v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 574 (D.N.D. 1959) ; State v. Myers, 241 Iowa 670, 42 N.W.2d
79 (1950) ; Graczyk v. State, 230 Md. 299, 303, 186 A.2d 616, 618 (1962) (dictum) ;
cf. Monohan v. State, 135 Ind. 216, 34 N.E. 967 (1893) (the statement relied on
was by an unauthorized party). The failure to speak out at such a crucial time
supports an inference that there was no plea arrangement made at all, or that, even
if there was, the defendant did not rely thereon.
79 See Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1956) (sevnble) ; United
States v. Wallace, 217 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
80 See United States v. Orlando, 327 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1964); People v.
Sharp, 157 Cal. App. 2d 205, 320 P.2d 589 (Dist. Ct App. 1958); State v. Little,
205 Ore. 659, 288 P.2d 446 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 975 (1956). But see
Andrews v. Langlais, 179 A.2d 858, 860 (R.I. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 960 (1962).
81 See, e.g., Orlando v. United States, supra note 80.-
82 See People v. Ensor, 319 Ill. 255, 149 N.E. 737 (1925).
88 See Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Disection, 42 YALE
L.J. 1, 18 (1932). Much has been written which criticizes the plea bargaining process
in its operation, see, e.g., PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 169-72
(1953); Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385
(1951); Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1927);
Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 506 (1941),
but Arnold appears to be the only authority to set forth the ethical arguments
against plea bargaining although he does not personally regard them as persuasive.
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with determinate sentencing statutes, by opposing society's decision that
criminal conduct be met with particular penalties. 4 The argument can be
pressed further by the contention that the elimination of plea bargaining
would safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
1. The Argument Based on Society's Interest
The arguments on behalf of society's interests avoid the very issue in
question, namely, who is to decide what society's interests are. One of the
most significant aspects of the prosecutor's functions is his responsibility to
determine society's interest in individual cases 8 5 Prosecuting attorneys
traditionally have had discretion to institute criminal charges.8 6 Broad
prosecutorial discretion in invoking the various criminal statutes has been
widely recognized as an effective means of implementing legislative enact-
ments with due regard to particular fact situations and the individuals
involved8 7 The justifications for this pervasive power are strong: it is for
the prosecutor to evaluate his evidence and the likelihood of conviction; 88
the expense involved in prosecuting may far outweigh any advantage to be
gained by a conviction; 8 9 there may have been only a technical violation for
which a warning may suffice; 9 0 and the prosecutor's time might be better
spent on other cases.91 In addition, considerations of fairness may indicate
that prosecution should be avoided. 92 Moreover, there are statutes in every
jurisdiction which are outmoded and which if strictly enforced would give
rise to public indiguation 3
For similar reasons, prosecutors also have a wide range of discretion in
determining the offenses to charge once a decision is made to prosecute.9
Furthermore, after charges have been instituted, a prosecutor may grant
immunity to a defendant in order to obtain his cooperation in other criminal
proceedings.9 5 In most jurisdictions, a prosecutor must obtain the per-
84 See Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for
the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 507 (1958).
85 See SCHWARTZ, CASES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10-34 (1961); Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of
Prosecution, 23 J. CRIs. L., C. & P.S. 770, 786-92 (1932); Note, Prosecutor's Dis-
cretion, 103 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1057 (1955); Note, 34 IND. L.J. 477 (1959). Compare
Williams, Discretion in Prosecuting, 1956 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 222.
86 See authorities cited note 85 supra.
87 See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1955); Williams, supra note 85,
at 223.
88 Baker, supra note 85, at 786.
89 See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain JTustice,
46 J. Canm. L., C. & P.S. 780, 788 (1956).
9o See Williams, supra note 85, at 225.
91 See Baker, supra note 85, at 787.
92 See Williams, supra note 85, at 223.
93 Id. at 224-25.
94 See Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum);
United States v. Games, 258 F.2d 530, 533-34 (2d Cir. 1958) (dictum) ; SCHWARTZ,
op. cit. supra note 85, at 13; cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 294
(1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
95 See Baker, supra note 85, at 788-89.
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mission of the court to nolle prosequi a charge; 96 however, the courts have
generally not denied such motions.9 7
With this background of prosecutorial discretion, it is somewhat incon-
sistent to insist that plea bargaining be absolutely foreclosed in the interest
of society. The recent New Jersey case of State v. Ashby 98 illustrates un-
warranted judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion. There the
defendant was charged with five separate violations of the open lewdness
statute. The prosecuting attorney and the county judge had agreed, at
the solicitation of defense counsel, that the open lewdness counts be nolle
prosequied and the defendant be permitted to plead guilty to complaints
in the magistrate's court for violations of the Disorderly Persons Act.
This procedure was apparently considered appropriate since no children
were involved in the incidents, there was no touching or use of force, the
defendant was receiving psychiatric treatment and would continue to do so
until rehabilitated, and the defendant, a family man, would have lost his
security clearance with his employer if convicted on the lewdness charges.
Permission to nolle prosequi the five indictments was obtained from the
acting assignment judge.99 Defendant had pleaded guilty to being a dis-
orderly person in two separate magistrate's courts 100 and was prepared to
so plead to the three remaining counts when the regular assignment judge
returned from vacation and notified the prosecutor that he would not permit
the lewdness counts to be nolle prosequied, because he "generally looked
with disapproval upon indictments being dismissed where the proof was
clear." 101
Defendant instituted an action to require the prosecutor to nolle
prosequi the charges or alternatively for the court to dismiss the indictments.
The appellate court held that two of the indictments should be dismissed
because of the defense of double jeopardy, but that the court had no power
96 See Comm. on Criminal Courts & Procedure, N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n,
Discussion of Proposed Criminal Law Enforcement Reforms 148-49; Note, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1066-67 (1955) ; State v. Ashby, 195 A.2d 635, 639 (N.J. Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1963) ; State v. Persons, 117 Vt. 556, 96 A.2d 818 (1953).
97 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 144 (Pound & Frankfurter eds. 1922);
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO 79 (Blackburn
ed. 1935) ; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1071-72 (1955).
98 195 A.2d 635 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1963).
99 The assignment judge was on vacation at the time. The appellate division
emphasized the fact that defense counsel did not inform the acting assignment judge
that the assignment judge did not permit the nolle prosequi of any indictments when
the state had a clear case. Also the county judge stated subsequently that he
thought that only one indictment was to be nolle prosequied. 195 A.2d at 640. The
dissenting opinion discusses these two points and takes the position that there was
no need for counsel to inform the acting assignment judge of the regular assignment
judge's policy and that the county judge, although he may have misunderstood the
number of indictments involved, acknowledged the letter from the acting judge
which specifically mentioned the five indictments. 195 A.2d at 644 (dissenting
opinion).
100 The offenses were committed in different communities within the county,
195 A.2d at 636.
101195 A.2d at 644 (dissenting opinion).
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to order the prosecutor to move a nolle prosequi of the remaining indict-
ments. Furthermore, the court concluded that enforcement was not re-
quired as a matter of fair play-the prosecutor had not initiated the ar-
rangement nor was there any benefit to the public.
The court's description of the issue in the case is misleading. The
issue was not whether the prosecutor should be compelled to nolle prosequi
the remaining counts, but the appropriateness of the assignment judge's
total abnegation of prosecutorial discretion on dismissal of charges when the
state could prove its case. Although there was no actual prejudice to the
defendant on the three remaining counts, it seems unfortunate that the court
had such a myopic concept of benefit to society. The primary guides in
sentencing today are rehabilitation and the ultimate assimilation of the de-
fendant into society. 10 2 The trial judge could have suspended sentence on
the charges if defendant were convicted after pleading guilty to the lewdness
charges, but this would have meant the loss of his livelihood and perhaps
his means of obtaining psychiatric treatment. Here, the prosecutor and two
judges considered the pleas to the lesser included offenses sufficient penalty
in light of the circumstances. If the assignment judge had been less
niggardly in his view of prosecutorial discretion, defendant's chances of
rehabilitation would have been more likely, a needless expenditure of time
and money would have been avoided, and the prosecutor could have devoted
his efforts and available funds to the detection and prosecution of more
serious offenders who are a substantial threat to the public.
Prohibition of plea bargaining might lead to a substantial increase in
the number of trials required for the disposition of criminal actions.' 03 Al-
though some judges would continue to impose more lenient sentences on
guilty-pleading defendants than on those found guilty after trial, 0 4 the
absence of plea bargaining should cause a decrease in the number of guilty
pleas since plea bargaining plus judicial leniency probably results in more
pleas than leniency alone.0 5 An increase in criminal trials would severely
tax an already overburdened system.10 6 More trials would require more
state and federal employees-judicial, prosecutorial, and administrative.
Additional courtroom facilities and prosecution offices would be essential,
and administrative costs would grow proportionately larger. The need
for more man-hours of defense counsel time to prepare the criminal cases
for trial would pose another serious problem. Attorneys called upon to
contribute their time and talent to an ever increasing criminal trial docket
might be unable to spend necessary time in diverse areas of their practice
in which they serve other valuable societal interests. Moreover, an in-
102 See, e.g., Bennett, The Sentence and Treatment of Offendery, 339 Annals,
Jan. 1962, p. 142.
103 See Appendix, question 5, infra.
104 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
105 See Appendix, question 5, infra.
106 See United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 1960);
ScHvwARTz, op. cit. supra note 85, at 27; Ohlin & Remington, supra note 84, at 500.
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creased trial docket can mean a consequential increase in the period of
imprisonment for defendants awaiting trial.
07
2. The Argument Based on Defendants' Interest
Trials do not seem essential to protect the constitutional rights of in-
dividuals. To the extent that the opponents of plea bargaining advance
their argument as benefiting criminal defendants by requiring a trial deter-
mination of truth, they evince a devout faith in the infallibility of trial as a
method of learning the truth. Trial is a sound procedure, constructively
workable, and peculiarly suited to our society. Yet, it is at best only an
imprecise means of determining truth. 08 The accusatorial system requires
a legal contest between prosecution and defense, the results of each case
often depending on the skill of the attorneys and a modicum of luck. There
are circumstances when the choice of a trial by judge or jury can be a
precarious decision for a defendant, 0 9 even for one who realizes that the
prosecution's case is not incontestable. Moreover, when a defendant knows
the prosecution can prove the case, the bargained plea is in his interest and
provides a necessary incentive for the avoidance of the needless expense of a
trial." 0
If by appropriate judicial safeguards, the plea bargaining practice and
subsequent entry of a guilty plea could approximate the trial procedure's
method of ascertaining guilt, criticism would be reduced substantially and
the practice could be maintained as an effective procedure for the disposi-
tion of criminal cases.
B. Suggested Safeguards
1. A Concept of Voluntariness Suitable for Guilty Pleas
The courts have failed to develop a standard for testing the voluntary
character of guilty pleas other than that the pleas be "truly voluntary" "I
or "freely made." 112 It is possible that some courts are incorporating the
concept as developed in the confession context,"13 but different considera-
tions are relevant for guilty pleas.
107 See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoLUm. L. RE.V.
846 (1957).
108 See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK, NOT GULTY
(1957).
109 E.g., a defendant with a prior record may fear that the admission of his
past record into evidence to impeach his testimony will have a disastrous effect in an
otherwise close case. See Newman, supra note 89, at 784. Trial before a judge is
not the easy solution since a judge is likely to be influenced by the facts of the case
in determining what sentence to impose. See Pilot Institute 287.
110 See Ohlin & Remington, supra note 84, at 501.
Il See Sorrenti v. United States, 306 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1962); Martin v.
United States, 256 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1958).
112 See United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 1963)
(separate opinion of Biggs, J.); Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 579-80
(5th Cir. 1957) (en bane dissent) ; see text accompanying notes 27-40 supra.
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The rule excluding coerced confessions from evidence originated at
common law; 114 the purpose of the rule was to exclude statements made
under circumstances which cast doubt on their trustworthiness.115 Thus, a
confession coerced from a defendant by physical or psychological means
which deprived the defendant of his free will and decision-making capacity,
or one induced by promises of leniency, was inadmissible as evidence
against him, because there was doubt that the facts expressed therein
actually occurred.11
The constitutional doctrine that confessions must be voluntary de-
veloped under the theory that due process requires a fair trial.117 Utiliza-
tion of a defendant's own confession given under circumstances which
render its trustworthiness uncertain is such a questionable procedure for
determining guilt that it denies the defendant a fair hearing." 8 Today the
constitutional doctrine is much broader than the trustworthiness rationale.
In Rogers v. Richmond,' 9 the Court said that involuntary confessions are
excluded under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle
in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the state must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and
may not by coercion prove its charges against an accused out of his
own mouth.120
Thus, in determining whether a confession has been voluntarily made under
federal constitutional standards it is necessary to consider the declaration
in terms of the requirement that only fair and decent practices be used
to obtain statements from defendants 12 1-"the question in each case is
whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed." 122
Confessions induced by promises of leniency are commonly held in-
admissible as evidence because of the peculiarly persuasive influence of a
promise under such circumstances.'2 As was said in Brain v. United
States, "the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide
114 See 3 WmoMRE, EVIDENCE §§ 817-20 (3d ed. 1940).
115 Id. § 822.
116 Id. §§ 831-36.
117 See Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN.
L. REV. 411, 414-17 (1954).
118 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
119 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
120 Id. at 540-41; see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
121 The state standard of admissibility may still depend on the trustvorthiness
standard. See, e.g., State v. Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 1963).
122 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
123 See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ; State v.
Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 1963).
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upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the
declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted." 124 Considering
prosecution promises made to induce guilty pleas in light of the original and
more limited due process standard-trustworthiness-, they are brought
into serious question. But the traditional trustworthiness concept utilized
in testing the voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession is not properly
applicable to guilty pleas.
A guilty plea and a confession are analogous but distinct concepts. A
confession is an averment that certain facts occurred, and is used as evidence
in a fact-finding proceeding-trial-whose whole purpose is to determine
whether the facts actually occurred. The nature of the trial proceeding
requires that consideration be given to evidence, such as a confession, only
to the extent that it has probative value, and, therefore, strict rules of
admissibility have been formulated. On the other hand, the guilty plea
is not necessarily an admission that the defendant engaged in a criminal
incident, but is a conclusion that there is sufficient evidence-for a judge or
jury to find that he did so. As a result of this distinction, the guilty plea
gives rise to a procedure for disposition of the case that is different from
trial. The court is no longer concerned with whether given facts occurred,
but only with whether the defendant has made an informed determination
that a judge or jury could find such facts on the prosecution's evidence.
In this sense, the plea procedure approximates the result likely to be
achieved by trial, but by a different method; 125 the considerations which
govern the acceptance of the guilty plea are different from those deter-
mining the admissibility of confessions. In contrast to a confession, the
reliability of a guilty plea is measured in terms of the substantiality of the
prosecution's case. This determination might be left to defendant and his
counsel, but the possibility of a plea bargain suggests the need for judicial
scrutiny of all guilty pleas to protect against overreaching of defendants by
prosecutors. If the judge concludes, after asking the prosecutor for a
summary of the evidence available for trial, that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the prosecutor could sustain his case, the guilty plea should
ordinarily be accepted 16 when the defendant and the prosecutor have made
a determination that it is in their respective interests to dispose of the case
by plea, and the defendant has an understanding of the nature of the charge,
the possible penal consequences, and the recommendatory nature of the
prosecution's promise. Under these circumstances, it seems proper for
the prosecutor in his informed discretion to enter into an agreement with
124 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).
125 E.g., in United States v. Hester, 325 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1963), the court,
after brief statements from the defendant, his counsel, and government counsel about
the alleged offense, suggested that the defendant plead not guilty since a similar
case before a jury resulted in an acquittal.
126 Although the propriety of the particular arrangement should ordinarily be
left to the determination of the prosecutor because he is more fully acquainted with
the facts of the particular case, the weaknesses in his evidence, and the time and
cost limitations involved, the courts must maintain some minimal control over tlfe
disposition of cases by plea arrangements to avoid flagrant abuse of discretion.
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the accused. Moreover, it does not seem that the defendant is overborne
if, after considering the prosecution's evidence with the help of counsel, he
concludes that it is in his interest to accept a given result rather than await
the uncertain outcome of trial.
The broader due process test-which is concerned with the govern-
ment practices utilized-does not require the abolishment of plea bargain-
ing but closer regulation to insure that its operation does not offend Anglo-
American criminal law concepts. Since the decision to enter a guilty plea
involves legal considerations, the active involvement of counsel is necessary
to safeguard both voluntariness and understanding.
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference has recommended that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure be changed in part to contain the following: "The court . .
shall not accept such plea [of guilty] or a plea of nolo contendere without
first (a) making such inquiry as may satisfy it that the defendant in fact
committed the crime charged . .. 127 This recommendation ignores
the distinction between the guilty plea procedure and the trial procedure,
and apparently directs the court to engage in an abridged trial to determine
actual guilt, something that even a formal trial only inaccurately accom-
plishes. A judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's case is a better safeguard
for the plea procedure than a summary determination of actual guilt, and it
adequately protects the defendant against over-reaching. A judicial inquiry
at a ple proceeding which includes a determination of the substantiality of
the prosecution's case goes beyond the requirements set forth by the en banc
majority in Shelton v. United States.128 But this much more is needed to
protect defendants who have miscalculated the prosecutor's case. It is
recognized that this procedure will involve more judicial time in accepting
guilty pleas than normally taken, but this must be balanced against the
necessary protections required if plea arrangements are to be sanctioned.1
29
2. The Responsibilities of the Prosecutor
The practices employed to induce guilty pleas should be channelled by
prosecutors into those areas which create a minimal danger of coercion.
"The use of threats or promises calculated to deprive a defendant of his
freedom of choice is a denial of procedural fairness guaranteed by the
12731 F.R.D. 669, 673 (1962). An Alabama statute requires the trial judge
to hear witnesses offered by the prosecutor and the defendant or those summoned
by the judge and to accept a guilty plea only if the judge believes the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 264 (1940). VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.1-192 (1950) provides: "Upon a plea of guilty in a felony case, tendered in
person by the accused after being advised by counsel, the court shall hear and deter-
mine the case without the intervention of a jury . .. ."
128 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) ; see text accompanying note 36 sitpra.
129 cf. Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391
(1963). Judge Carter makes several suggestions which may involve more judicial
time on a § 2255 motion but which attempt to eliminate the possibility of successive
motions by the same prisoner. One of the most common grounds asserted on a
§ 2255 motion is that the plea of guilty was not voluntary. Id. at 395.
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fourteenth amendment and vitiates a plea of guilty which is so induced." 130
Many prosecutors draft charging papers with possible plea arrangements in
mind.13 1 A prosecutor's discretion to charge multiple counts, where proper,
should not be circumscribed. But a prosecutor should not include addi-
tional charges merely to bring pressure on a defendant to plead guilty.13 2
In many situations it may be difficult even for a cautious trial judge
to determine if the prosecutor's practice was designed to have, or actually
had, a coercive influence on the defendant. This is especially true since
the defendant is attempting to have his plea accepted and is not alleging
any coercive influence. The plea proceeding is basically nonadversary; the
prosecutor is attempting to have the case disposed of by plea and the de-
fendant is trying to have his plea accepted. At this point of time the inter-
ests of the parties merge. This complicates the court's obligation to deter-
mine whether the plea is voluntarily and understandingly made. There-
fore, whenever a plea agreement has been entered into or merely discussed
with a defendant or his counsel, the prosecutor has an ethical obligation
to inform the court of such action in order to facilitate the court's
examination. 133
Since the decision to plead guilty involves legal considerations, pros-
ecutors should not attempt to make any arrangements directly with defend-
ants, and should discuss possible plea agreements only with a defendant's
counsel.134 Observance of such a rule would necessarily minimize any
coercion or misunderstanding. The New York County Criminal Courts
Bar Association Code makes such a standard an ethical requirement for
prosecutors:
Regardless of the personal opinion of a prosecutor as to the
guilt of a defendant or any advantage which might accrue to the
defendant, he should not negotiate or bargain with the accused
for a plea of guilty or other disposition of a criminal case except
through counsel. It is improper for a prosecutor to attempt to
obtain such a plea by threat, direct or implied; and no representa-
130 Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 313 (D. Ore. 1963); see People v.
Picciotti, 4 N.Y.2d 340, 151 N.E.2d 191, 175 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1958); People v. Zilliner,
19 App. Div. 2d 806, 243 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1963); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,
286 (1941) (alternative holding).
131 See Appendix, question 11, infra; Polstein, How To "Settle" a Criminal Case,
8 PRAc. LAw. 35, 38 (1962).
132 Cf. People v. Picciotti, 4 N.Y.2d 340, 151 N.E.2d 191, 175 N.Y.S.2d 32
(1958).
133 Cf. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 5, 22 (1959); Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. & N.Y. County Lawyers'
Ass'n, Opinions, Opinion No. 145, at 596 (1956) (prosecutor should inform court
of possibly biased venireman). Many prosecutors inform the court when a plea
arrangement has been made. See Appendix, question 14, infra. Prosecutors should
not assume that the court is aware of the plea arrangement because of the circum-
stances of the case; a summary of any discussion of a plea arrangement should be
stated for the court's record.
134 See Appendix, question 10, infra.
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
tion or promise should be made by a prosecutor to the defendant
except in the presence of counsel.135
Prosecution promises which are beyond a prosecutor's official function,
such as making a promise of a definite judicial disposition of a case, are
improper, 36 and a guilty plea entered in ignorance of the prosecutor's
inability to fulfill his promise may ordinarily be withdrawn if the defendant
relies on the promise to his disadvantage.' 37 Whenever a plea arrangement
is made, it is essential that the defendant comprehend the independence of
the court and prosecutor. Even if a prosecutor knows that the trial judge
will usually sentence in accordance with his recommendation, he should,
as a matter of common practice, remind defendant's counsel that the judge
can depart from his established custom and that counsel should so inform
his client.' 38 Such a policy will tend to reduce misunderstandings and con-
sequential motions to withdraw.
The abuse which is directed at prosecutors by commentators because
of the unethical and political practices utilized in making plea bargains 139
can in great part be mitigated by the establishment of a general policy in
each office for handling plea bargaining. Evidently few prosecution de-
partments now have such established policies. 40 There are numerous
factors which may appropriately influence prosecutors to make a plea
agreement.' 41 The prosecutor should evaluate these factors and deter-
mine which he thinks his staff should consider. This will provide a common
standard within each office and result in more consistency. Such a respon-
sible attitude towards plea bargaining is a continuing obligation, and records
should be kept of all plea arrangements to facilitate periodic examination of
the general policy in operation.
3. Role of Defense Counsel
a. Importance of Counsel
Although some state courts prior to Gideon v. Wainwright '
42 held
that legal counsel was not necessary if the defendant pleaded guilty,'4 the
135 SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 85, at 24. (Emphasis added.)
136 This is true at least without the judge's agreement before the promise is
made.
137 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
138 Defense counsel should inform his client of the independence of the court and
prosecutor and of the possibility that the judge may not follow his customary sentenc-
ing practice whether the prosecutor reminds counsel or not.
139 See, e.g., Dash, supra note 83, at 392-405; Baker, supra note 85, at 790;
Note, 34 Ixw. L.J. 477, 483-86 (1958).
140 See Appendix, question 6, infra.
141 See Appendix, question 8, infra, for some of the factors considered relevant
by prosecutors in plea bargaining.
142 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
143 See People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N.W. 818 (1923); Common-
wealth ex rel. Curtis v. Ashe, 139 Pa. Super. 417, 12 A.2d 500 (1940).
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right to defense counsel will now be applied to pleading proceedings-
a critical stage of criminal procedure requiring expert legal advice. 44
Right to counsel means more than the mere presence of a legal aide;
it demands the effective assistance of counsel.145 The demonstration that an
attorney has given ineffective or incompetent representation, however, re-
quires exceptionally convincing proof. In order to sustain an allegation of
ineffective assistance, the representation must have been such "as to shock
the conscience of the court and make the proceedings a farce and a mockery
of justice." 146
The Supreme Court admonished in Kercheval v. United States, that
"out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after
proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences." 147
Defense counsel is important because the guilty plea involves a waiver
of all defenses and evidentiary questions which do not relate to the juris-
diction of the court.1 48 Legal advice from a defense attorney at the plead-
ing stage concerning the specific offenses alleged in the charging papers is
essential to a criminal defendant, and a legal expert is also significant in
making the necessary tactical evaluation of the probable outcome of a trial.
With an understanding of how the defendant's conduct relates to the ele-
ments of the crime charged and the possible penalties involved, a defendant
and his counsel can decide whether a guilty plea should be entered.149
If a guilty plea is contemplated as a possibility, defense counsel may
decide to discuss a plea arrangement with the prosecutor. 150 An attorney is
144 The scope of the right to counsel under the sixth amendment has been defined
to reach to arraignment proceedings in the federal courts. See Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941) ; Panagos v. United States, 324 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1963) ;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1937) (dictum). The federal practice is now
controlled by FED. R. Clm. P. 44: "If the defendant appears without counsel, the
court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at
every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able
to obtain counsel." (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), decided that indigent criminal defendants in state courts
were entitled to counsel at trial. The Court's per curiam disposition of the recent
case of Doughty v. Maxwell, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3279 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1964), indicates
that counsel is now required at arraignment proceedings in state courts. The Second
Circuit, shortly thereafter, relying on Doughty, concluded that legal representation
for indigent defendants in state proceedings, unless properly waived, is necessary on
pleas of guilty. United States ex rel. Durocher v. La Vallee, No. 28174, 2d Cir.,
March 26, 1964 (en banc).
145 See Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
146 Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
147 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
148 See United States ex rel. Staplers v. Pate, 222 F. Supp. 998, 1002-03 (N.D.
Ill. 1963) ; Willis v. State, 152 So. 2d 883 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963) ; People v. Brown,
13 Ill. 2d 32, 147 N.E.2d 336 (1958); Villasino v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 483,
190 N.E.2d 265 (1963) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Maroney, 198 Pa. Super.
85, 181 A.2d 852 (1962). If the indictment states no basis for jurisdiction, then the
conviction may be attacked. See, e.g., Hilderbrand v. United States, 261 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1958) ; Berg v. United States, 176 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1949).
149 See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1945).
150 Ibid.
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in a better position than the defendant to evaluate and discuss any plea
agreement. Moreover, the attorney will want to inquire about the court's
sentencing practice and thus better assess the value of any proposition made
by the prosecuting attorney.15 1 Under these circumstances, a defendant will
have a sympathetic legal expert helping him analyze all relevant factors in
arriving at the ultimate conclusion of whether to plead guilty.
Although the constitutional right to counsel is a significant protection
for criminal defendants, waiver of the right is permissible.
152 A strong
presumption, however, operates against the waiver of any constitutional
right.:' To waive effectively the right to counsel, the waiver must be
voluntarily and understandingly made.' 4  The mere declaration by a de-
fendant that he wants to waive his right to legal representation does not
terminate the court's responsibility-a full inquiry into the defendant's
ability to comprehend the proceedings and his reasons for waiver must be
made.155
One can seriously question whether a defendant who pleads guilty
should ever be permitted to waive counsel. The need for an attorney may
be more dramatically perceived in the trial context, but at least in that
situation there may be some tactical advantage for a defendant to be un-
represented-the court and the jury may be more sympathetically disposed
toward a layman contending with an accomplished legal expert. In the
guilty plea context, however, there is nothing for a defendant to gain by
being unrepresented-in fact, the very decision to plead guilty and waive the
right to trial requires an evaluation of the prosecution's case, something at
which a layman is inept. The right to an attorney interested in protecting
the interests of the defendant is such a substantial factor in the guilty plea
procedure that it is difficult to imagine a situation that would warrant a
finding of an informed waiver of that right.
b. Defendant's Reliance on Counsel's Advice
A criminal defendant's reliance on his counsel's erroneous sentence
prediction is not a recognized ground for withdrawal of a guilty plea.
15 6
151 As to sentencing practices see the data cited note 9 supra. This evaluation
includes, inter alia, consideration of what evidence is admissible at trial and an
understanding of the essential elements of the crime charged.
152 See Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437 (1948) (dictum).
153 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
164 See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1937).
155 See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.):
"[T]he asking of several standard questions followed by the signing of a standard
written waiver of counsel . . . may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts
essential to an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his
right to counsel."
156 See Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1953) ; In re Atchley,
48 Cal. 2d 409, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); Jacobs v. Warden, 232 Md. 627, 192 A.2d 786
(1963); State v. Andrews, 79 N.J. Super. 17, 190 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1963);
People v. Battice, 5 N.Y.2d 946, 156 N.E.2d 920 (1959); Commonwealth v. Green,
396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
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This general rule has evolved to avoid inquiry into the practices and tactics
of attorneys in handling their cases. Thus, counsel's advice that a more
lenient sentence will probably be imposed if the defendant pleads guilty,'
57
that the case can be won on appeal if the defendant enters a guilty plea,'
158
or that pleading guilty will enable the defendant to go before a lenient
judge,159 are not grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea when the advice
is ultimately proven erroneous. A defendant's unfulfilled expectation of
leniency, even if inspired by counsel, is not normally a ground for relief.160
When counsel has informed his client of the court's sentencing pro-
cedure and the range of sentence, and there is mere speculation as to what
the sentencing judge will do if the defendant pleads guilty, the application
of the general rule seems appropriate. When, however, a defendant can
prove that his attorney assured him that if he pleaded guilty a specific
sentence would be imposed or that a rehabilitation procedure such as
probation would be considered by the court, and the defendant relied
thereon to his disadvantage, there is some difficulty with the general rule.
The problem is in distinguishing the former situations from the latter. If
withdrawal of a guilty plea were permitted on the latter ground, trial judges
seeking to protect guilty plea convictions from collateral attack would at-
tempt to make some determination at the pleading proceeding as to whether
there has been any misrepresentation by the attorney. Any extensive in-
quiry into a defendant-attorney relationship with regard to the tenuous
distinction between good tactical advice and assurances of a definite sentence
disposition is questionable, and, therefore, the problem is best handled by
merely having the court make a general statement as to its sentencing
policy.
c. Defendant's Reliance on Counsel's Assertions of a Plea Bargain
In the interest of protecting attorneys, some courts have formulated
an equally stringent rule with regard to a defense counsel's alleged false
claims of a plea bargain: where there has been no plea promise by a gov-
ernment official, even though defense counsel has represented such to the
defendant and the defendant has relied thereon to his disadvantage, the plea
may not be withdrawn.' 6 ' The California Supreme Court in People v.
Gilbert set down the following more liberal test:
[I]f the representation of the private attorney presents a pur-
ported commitment by a responsible state officer which if actually
157 See Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1953).
158 See Moore v. United States, 249 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
'59 See United States v. Berry, 309 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1962).
160 See, e.g., People v. Schmidt, 10 Ill. 2d 221, 139 N.E.2d 726 (1957) ; State v.
Martin, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 106, 158 N.E.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1959); Ward v. State, 90
Okla. Crim. 120, 210 P.2d 790 (1949).
161 See Floyd v. United States, 260 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 947 (1959) ; Ex parte Dye, 73 Cal. App. 2d 352, 166 P.2d 388 (Dist. Ct. App.
1946); People v. Bofill, 19 Misc. 2d 708, 192 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1959).
Compare United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963).
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made would vitiate the plea and if the acts or statements of such
state officer, although innocently done or made, apparently cor-
roborate the representation, are in good faith and without negli-
gence relied upon by the defendant, and in truth operate to prevent
the exercise of his free will and judgment, then the state in its
solicitude for fairness will not accept the benefit of a plea so
given.1
62
Although the California rule may benefit some defendants, it avoids the
critical issue-whether the defendant was in fact misled to his disadvantage
by his attorney's false representations of a plea bargain. If he has, then
withdrawal of the guilty plea should be permitted whether there has been
corroboration or not. Admittedly, it may be difficult to analyze the impact of
a defense counsel's comments to his client, especially since much of the
discussion may have been forgotten and may involve conflicting testimony
of the defendant and his former counsel, but where a criminal defendant has
not had the opportunity to balance all relevant considerations before enter-
ing a guilty plea, without the misrepresentation of a plea bargain being
present to distort the determination, withdrawal of the guilty plea should
be permitted out of a "solicitude for fairness." 16
4. A More Responsible Role for the Trial judge
Some members of the judiciary play a participating role in plea bar-
gaining by attempting to persuade criminal defendants to plead guilty.,,
Often when this is done the judge gives a direct or implied promise that
some consideration will be granted with respect to the sentence if the de-
fendant enters a guilty plea.1e 5 To a defendant, the trial judge holds an
awesome position and any influence a judge uses may have a subtle coercive
effect on an individual already in an unsteady psychological state.166 Thus,
an overly zealous judge, despite his sincere interest in a defendant, may
unwittingly coerce the defendant into pleading guilty.
162 25 Cal. 2d 422, 443, 154 P.2d 657, 668 (1944).
163 Cf. United States v. Schneer, 194 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), vacated on rehearing,
105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
164 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 321 F2d 954 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Euziere v. United
States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); State v. Boulton, 229 Minn. 576, 40 N.W.2d 417 (1949); Rogers
v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So. 2d 331 (1962) ; People ex rel. Farina v. Klein, 208
Misc. 792, 145 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 777, 154 N.Y.S.2d
503 (1956); People v. Puma, 132 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Kings County Ct), appeals dis-
missed, 284 App. Div. 879, 135 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1954), 286 App. Div. 1086, 148
N.Y.S.2d 913 (1955), 2 App. Div. 2d 968, 159 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1956); People v.
Ryan, 132 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Kings County Ct 1954); Commonwealth v. Senauskas,
326 Pa. 69, 191 Atl. 167 (1937) ; Appendix, question 12, infra.
165 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 321 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1963); Euziere v.
United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp.
560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); State v. Koeppel, 250 Iowa 1052, 97 N.W.2d 926 (1959);
Rogers v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So. 2d 331 (1962); People v. Sullivan, 276
App. Div. 1087, 96 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1950); cf. State v. Boulton, 229 Min. 576, 40
N.W.2d 417 (1949).
168United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.N.Y.-1963).
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In United States v. Tateo,167 after substantial evidence had already
been heard in the case, the trial judge held a conference in his chambers
with the defense attorneys and the prosecutor. At this conference the
judge said that if the defendant continued with the trial and was subse-
quently found guilty, he would impose life sentences on the kidnapping
charges and consecutive, maximum sentences on the other charges. Defense
counsel immediately related this information to the defendant and, allegedly
as a consequence thereof, a guilty plea was entered. In the proceeding to
vacate the judgment of conviction, the court held coercive the trial judge's
imposition of the alternatives of a maximum sentence if defendant continued
with the trial and was found guilty or the possibility of more lenient treat-
ment if he pleaded guilty. Although the court alternatively concluded that
under the facts of Tateo the defendant was coerced, it went further by in-
dicating that such conduct by a judge is coercive per se.1 8 In the interest
of fairness to criminal defendants, trial judges should not become involved
in attempts to persuade a defendant to plead guilty.6 9
The trial judge's impartiality will insure that his inquiry into the de-
fendant's reasons for pleading guilty will not be influenced by any previous
arrangement made with the defendant. Perfunctory and rapid examina-
tions into the basis of guilty pleas are not appropriate procedures giving
due regard to the rights of criminal defendants. 170 Nor should the judge
delegate to the prosecuting attorney the responsibility to make the necessary
inquiry.' 71 If any plea bargaining has occurred, the prosecutor may pre-
arrange a colloquy with defendant; it is improper to turn over the function
167United States v. Tateo, supra note 166.
168 d. at 567. The same alternatives found objectionable in Tateo were present
in United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963). However,
the Second Circuit held that, even assuming the facts to be true, the guilty plea was
not coerced as a matter of law. Instead, the case was remanded for a determination
of whether the plea was coerced as a matter of fact. Id. at 313. McGrath deals with
state court activity and therefore is distinguishable from Tateo which involved super-
visory control over the federal district courts. The factual allegations if true, how-
ever, indicated an even clearer situation than Tateo. McGrath was personally present
in the judge's chambers and the judge was explicit in posing the choice open to him
by saying among other things that upon conviction of first degree robbery he "would
'be entitled to no consideration of any kind from me [judge]' and '[i]f I [judge]
sentence you after a conviction of robbery in the first degree, you are going to be
away until you are an old man."' Id. at 321 (dissenting opinion). The judge's
comments were somewhat qualified and interspersed with such phrases as "of course,
if you want a trial, you will certainly get a fair trial." Id. at 323 (dissenting opinion).
All the qualifications, however, bore on the impartiality of the trial defendant would
receive; they did not negate the fact that unless McGrath pleaded guilty to the lesser
indicted offense, he would receive no consideration if found guilty on the greater
offense. McGrath at first requested time to consider the judge's comments, but
after the judge concluded his discussion he decided to accept the plea without taking
time to ponder the move. For another case holding conduct coercive per se, see
Letters v. Commonwealth, 193 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1963).
169 The coercive influence, although subtle, is ever present As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has said: "there must be both the capacity to make an understanding
choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice is. clearly free and
responsible." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 33.2 U.S. 708, 729 (1948) (concurring opinion).
170 See Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961) ; United States
v. Lester, 247 F2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957).
17' But see'Turner v. United States, No. 17,132, 8th Cir., Jan. 8, 1964.
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of ascertaining the appropriateness of the plea to a party who has an interest
in seeing that the plea is accepted.
Plea arrangements should ordinarily be affirmed by the courts and
the guilty plea accepted. But the judiciary, whenever a plea bargain has
been made, bears an obligation to evaluate the circumstances of the case
and determine the propriety of the particular bargain to prevent flagrant
abuses of discretion by prosecutors.
If a judge follows the systematic practice of sentencing concurrently
on all counts or suspending sentence on all but the major counts in a
multiple-count indictment where the offenses arise out of the same incident,
he should inform a defendant of his practice when the defendant has ten-
dered a guilty plea to less than all of the charges as a result of an agreement
with the prosecutor. Of course, the judge would have to make it clear
that he is not bound to follow the practice in any given case and that he
will not reach any conclusions as to the defendant's sentence until the time
for sentencing arrives. Thus, a defendant who felt pressured into pleading
guilty because of the multiple charges could give more consideration to his
decision to plead guilty. There would be no coercive influence from the
judge's remarks since at most the defendant will be persuaded to demand a
trial. If trial judges were to inform guilty-pleading defendants of their
sentencing practices, prosecutors would probably inform defendants of the
customary procedure as a matter of practical necessity.
The emphasis in sentencing procedures today is on rehabilitation and
each step in the administration of criminal justice should be considered in
these terms.172 A defendant's awareness of the court's interest in assuring
protection of his rights provides a proper foundation for any rehabilitation
program which may follow. A mere perfunctory inquiry at the time of
pleading may indicate to a defendant that the entire procedure is a mere
formality and that the courts are not independent of the prosecutor's office.
On the other hand, the court's inquiry should also impress on the defendant
that society's interest is being served by the plea arrangement, and that
the defendant has not, in effect, made a deal that benefits only himself.
The following areas of inquiry are suggested as an appropriate basis
for determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and understandingly
made. But it is impractical to recommend a standard form of inquiry to be
made inflexibly in every case; the form and content of a trial judge's inquiry
must be adapted to the particular defendant and circumstances.
(1) The indictment or information should be read to the defendantY.
73
(2) The court should explain' the charges in terms suitable to the de-
fendant's intelligence and experience.
172 See Bennett, The Sentence and Treatment of Offenders, 339 Annals, Jan. 1962,
p. 142.
173 It is essential that the charges be read so that the court can be sure the de-
fendant understands the basis for the prosecution. The charging papers should not
be read in a manner which does not permit their meaning to be understood. Where
there are multiple similar offenses the total number charged should be indicated.
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(3) The defendant should be asked to indicate how he desires to
plead.174
(4) If the defendant indicates a desire to plead guilty, the court should
inquire into his reasons for so doing.
(5) The court should then explain what the right to trial means and
the effect of waiver.'
75
(6) The defendant should be asked if he wants to waive his right to
trial.
(7) The court should request the prosecutor to summarize the evi-
dence which he can produce to support his case.
(8) If there is a substantial likelihood that a jury or trial judge could
convict on the evidence, 176 a general inquiry should be made as to the events
surrounding defendant's apprehension:
(a) circumstances of apprehension;
(b) police practices during period of arrest;
(c) discussion of case personally or through counsel with pros-
ecutor, members of his staff, or a staff member of any investigating
agency.
(9) If the inquiry up to this point has not brought out the possibility
of a plea arrangement, the court should make a specific inquiry as to any
possible arrangements.
177
(10) If the inquiry with defendant demonstrates that there has been
no plea arrangement, then the court should ask the prosecutor and the
defense counsel whether any arrangements were made with any parties,
and, if not, whether any possible arrangements were discussed.
(11) If the court concludes that there has been no plea arrangement
then the court can proceed to an explanation of the consequences of the plea.
174 Where the questions can be answered by the defendant, it would be better
practice to elicit the answers from him. In Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988
(8th Cir. 1964), the court stressed the need for informality in these proceedings to
elicit more easily responses from the accused.
175 When the defendant is represented by counsel, the court can inquire whether
the attorney has explained to the defendant his right to trial. The courts explanation
should include a reference to trial before a judge instead of a jury if the defendant
so elects.
176 If the court finds that there is not a substantial likelihood of conviction at
trial, the court should refuse to accept the plea.
177 Has there been a promise of a sentence recommendation or disposition? Is
there to be a recommendation on an "if asked" basis? Did the prosecutor promise
to make a recommendation for the probation report? Has the prosecutor agreed
not to ask for the maximum sentence? Has the prosecutor agreed to permit a plea
to a lesser included offense? Has the prosecutor agreed to accept a guilty plea to
less than all of the counts in the indictment? Has the prosecutor promised not to
institute actions on other charges, e.g., under the multiple offender statute? Have
there been any collateral promises, e.g., not to prosecute. others?
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However, if a plea arrangement has been made, the court should make a
determination that the arrangement is not a flagrant abuse of prosecutorial
discretion.
(12) If the court determines that the plea arrangement is appropriate,
it should explain the court's independence from the prosecutor and its prac-
tice of withholding decision on sentence or dismissal of charges until the
time for such action arises.
17 8
(13) If the defendant persists in entering a guilty plea, the court
should determine whether the defendant has made a determination that it
is in his interest to plead guilty, and where the acceptance of the plea does
not bind the court, that the defendant has an understanding of the recom-
mendatory nature of the particular plea arrangement.
(14) If the court concludes that there has been no coercive influence
then it should explain the consequences of the plea: 17
9
(a) range of possible punishment;
(b) possibility of multiple offender statute application to the
present charge;
(c) absence of any particular rehabilitation procedure.
(15) The defendant should be asked if he has any questions or state-
ments to make and whether he has been satisfied with the services of his
attorney.
(16) Finally, the defendant should be asked to plead.
Dominick R. Vetri
178 Of course some arrangements can bind the court if it accepts the plea-for
example, a plea to a lesser included offense. The defendant must be made to under-
stand he has to balance the benefit which might be obtained under the plea arrange-
ment against the possibility of being acquitted at trial or possibly getting the same
sentence if convicted at trial. If the defendant desires time to contemplate or discuss
the matter with his attorney, the court should permit him to do so.
179 The court could also make some general statement about the attachment of
social stigma and the loss of certain privileges-e.g., right to vote, eligibility for armed
services, deportation, and opportunity to operate certain businesses subject to regu-
lation by the state. The defendant should be given every opportunity to have any
point clarified.
1964]
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APPENDIX
The following are the results of a questionnaire concerning plea bargaining prac-
tices which was sent to 205 chief prosecuting officers in the most populous counties
of forty-three states.1 80 Ninety-nine of the questionnaires were distributed to six
states: California, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania. The
remaining 106 questionnaires were distributed about evenly among the remaining
thirty-seven states.
Eighty-three replies were received 181 representing thirty-one states.182 Forty-
four of the replies were from the six-state group.18 3
180 The questionnaires were distributed and returned in the Fall of 1963. The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review is grateful for the financial aid it received
in this project from the University of Pennsylvania Law School's Institute of Legal
Research. The specific source of any answer has not been identified since a covering
letter indicated that all information received would be held in strict confidence.
United States Attorneys declined to participate in the survey.
181 The replies included seventy-eight cuestionnaires and five letters. The letters
have only been considered in question two, infra. Eighty-three replies out of 205
questionnaires distributed constitutes a return of 40.5 percent.
182 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
183 Space for comments was left at the end of each question. Two questions, one
dealing with whether records were kept of plea bargaining conversations and the
other with whether it was the practice to explain to the defendant that the court
was not bound by any prosecution recommendations, were eliminated from considera-
tion because of possible ambiguities in interpretation of the question. A third question
concerning whether possible search and seizure violations affected plea bargaining
has been eliminated because it is essentially covered by question eight.
[See page 908 infra for notes 184 to 200.]
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
0
O0a
C, .
o d 20 &4
~. ~ 0.
'Z , .O' (D
t3 C. to.
20 .
Co' 
4
c : 3 o
00
02 j.
00 
Lk
'2 0 C: %
0= .0
- - Cd ) bp $,-d
0 00
-~s C )4.
0 0 W
0'
xC 0 cis d 10
.2 (CO 2.1
0 0)
1. '8 w 2 0ba
u , CQj1
0 0 U13 2 0L.P-
la A ~ 02.0 .
it 02
CISC
-~ ' 0z ~0- 02 ~
.1i 0 C',-
P-4 *z .
898 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
- t*) el
00, 0 0
N 
"  
[N . N
%0 r
) ONU
00
Cd 4 E-
P-4'~
0
E-
z~)-
e. Lk Lk
0 0 U
a)
000
0.U 0
0.04
0 0
[Vol.112:865
cq
vl. L-R',
0 "It uO)
i<, ca, %6,
KO m'
.,:
03
0
05)
5)
.4-)
0
a)
0
4-.
0
a)
0.
H
0
U
'0
0
'-4
U)
4-
cO OS '
0
0)
Cv
Oo'
&oo
mcg
0).
0-. C
- .2
U0
4
C'
pq C
o0)
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
co
..~ C~
'U
-C.
.~
C
C)
4--
'U
4-. 'C
C
4-.
C)
C
4-4 ~
I-) if)
4--
4-4
-C.
C
4-.
4-;. C~
C
4-.
C ~
~
~
.~ "'-4
4-.
4-4
C
C
4--.
C
0
"a"
4-,
4--
C
4-'
C
4--
'4-
C
4--
.0 4-.
I~5
0
1 L;. ;-' 1  0 ,
U- -;= D
4C= : .4
4.
IV
1964]
I.)
tn
PQ M
0 0 O0
w 4- - 4 u
U) 1-0 % .*
00
%0123 u)~cot- 00
0
&0
C41
co C4
p
0 50'
U55 ) '
4-.d10
0
0
w 0
A q
900 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
0.0
00
-4- t
9-.
[Vol.112:865
Of)
1-4 4 *-
~~20..
0
.~
1)
0)
0.
01~~~2j I~
0 1.
0
0.
.0 I2.~~
~
9.
00k
'000
C) 0
0
04
.2 0
0
0)
Ei
Z*4I~.
I,
0..
0
0
0.
01
9-.
0
0.
0)1~
.0 O.~
0 0
0, 0
00
0.0
C4.
'0 0
U*)
C's0
0.
00.
00:
5)
A .
Q. e e Lk
el
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
e0 tR
r0 c
00
Z"2
0. 3
V)L
a, 0 t3~
9-.
0
0.20.. ~'~0
2..
~0.
2..
0
0.2
0
00.02)
02)
CO. I C> 1
00 %0 00
1-4
L0'0 l ZAeltke
40.0 rU)i('4026 c v
coN C1 V n! l
in0. I I "
8 10
4..
0
00
0)
002 00 b)
0
S .2 ho' w _
2.. 02 0 2I
0 0 2.01.2~4;U 0(~
0
2..
C; = .2 .
0 Q, CO
0 5J-'.
02 02J.111 0 0. P0.
d .6 C -6 03 g ,d....4..a
1964]
el LR Lk e v' -r 0- U
Vz elZRL
902 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:865
Ll4 N3 el elZ-v V
p .Q
C.
c,
" .4 U ,
" .0
Il I-q I 14 I I I I I
w40 400 It u N m X
00
-c
[3 d [z :4
o E. E.t -
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
a, 'IT "rm
V E,
,. ! - I I I
04~ O\) 'l cNCl
0 bo
0.
n P- P-
'0 ~
0
.~ ',.~ el. e'. Z~ Lk) Lcc
4. Q
t3 C'..
.2 C-
C) t
4..q
.~ '-~-0
k
0.4
0
:~~4 ~-~-
'~'~
0
M I I I
% '0 t.' NO "t Mc
0
0 SE =1 .0
0 HH -M P4 (
904 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:865
0 R
u 00c
'6
-- I C
~ C.;
-42-
P.. 0
-00
00
00
C.a
0q0
C5~
0
Cd
0
C)
0
0
0
.0
*0
C)
C-,
C)
C-,
0
Co
-C-,
*0
C)
C.-.
C)
*0
C)
C)
C))
C-
C)
.0
C)
C)
.0.
0
C)
Co
Co
C)
C..
*0.
C-,
0
C.
0
-C-,
CC)
C)
0
.0.
*0.
C)
C.
0
-C)
C)
C)
C)
C..
C-,
C)
C-,
0
0 -~
~C.
~-C.
0
.0
6
0 ~
~ ~O6O ad
0 O,~ O~
CO
C)
.C)C-,~. ~.
~U~~;i :2
0-C.
C)
~II I
.2
0
04-0
C) C
C-.C 0
00
C."
OOo
00
C)-1 9
ad
0
C)
0
0
C)
C.-.
C)
C)
C)
0
C)
C)
.0
*0
C)
CO
0
0C).
*0
C..
C)
0
*0
0
C)
C..
0
C..
0
0
C)
C)
0
C..
0.
0
C..
C)
.0
E
0z
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
'7
C)
U)
'7
0
'4-.
0
U)
C)',
~.U)
U)>1
'7
C)
U.
'7
0
C..
'4-'
0
C)"
C..U)
'7
C- 0
C)
U)
'7
0
C-
-- C
0
C)',
C-U)
U)~N
00 CD) U C
C CU\
0
C.)
00
S.
(:4
C:4
C:4 , C44
:C. =
0 0
'0U
04.
0
0
C> C
C.2
go
u')
0
'0 0
. u
pq l '
Cd a
.2.
P. -M
U.
P., m
O > 4
CCk
ag 0
C,
0
S)
'CU
0
Z.
AU P. P
'7
0
C-.
.4-'
04..
U) 4-4
.0 '~
-U)
'7
C-
0
'7
0
9-.
0
C-'
U)'7
.0 U)
'7
C..
0 a,
C)
C..
9-.
0
C-
U)',
.0 U)
906 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSY1LVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:865
4-,
4-,
3
N-.
3
4-,
.4- ' '30~
C)~, 41 S
Ce),".
,,6
eo
Ca.
Q4-
3
C-)
S
S
0
0
.3
~a.
0
3
C)
3
0
0
3
0
C)
3
3
4-)
C)
.3
.3
C)
'-3
3
3
.3
C)
3
3
.3
3
3
3
3
0
3.
C)
'-4
0
3
'-4
0
3
0
C)
0
'-4
34
0
4..
C-,
.3
S
3
:2;
3
C)
3
C)
C)
C)
3
N-.
3
3
C)
3
N-.
3
3
3
N-.
3
C)
C)
3
C)
4-,
C).3
3
C)
C)
4-,
3
C)
C)
C)
3 Q..
-3)
3..-
.3
C)3
kC)
C)-
.~ -~.
06
%0 C
%4-,
Cd)
CIS
0 -0
Q, P-4~ '3 z
GUILTY PLEA BARGAINING
VR t
0 0 <
m-
'7
to
0
0
'7
*0
to
to
0
.4-,
to
'to
to
to
to
to
to
'7
3-
to
'7
'7
to
to
to
to
to
to
3-
to
3-
to
to
to~
to)
'7
'to
to
to
*0,
0'-.
to~
.4-,
'to,~
to~
'7-
too
0
N -
0
'to
to
.4-,
to
'to
to
to
to
to
to
'7
3-,
to
'7
'7
to
to
to
to
to
3-
0)
'7
'to
to
to
0
to--
~to
to~
'to
0
to
'to '7
'to
'~ to
'7
-to
03-
0' 0
to 4--
to)3-~
'-to
too)
.0
'to
~to
3-,
too)
-- '7
,-~-0,
if)
. 04~1
H~t
al *c *
pq bO
'7 t~ r
3-q m U -
8 ~ -~-
to et
'7
3-,
0
'7
0
3--
.4-,
00
3-0
to~
4
,~U)C~)
~'1
0
C, ~
to
:.0
0C
C 0
cd
p.4
0
1964]
'7 m\0 C
0 l
C4,d \
908 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
184 E.g., one prosecutor responded "no" to question two but subsequently indi-
cated that defense counsel initiate plea arrangement discussions and that his office
then determines whether a lesser plea or the dismissal of certain charges is appropriate.
Another prosecutor said in response to question four, "we won't bargain for a plea
-at times we agree to recommend leniency but it is firmly understood that the final
decision is that of the judge." Similarly, a third prosecutor in this group in response
to question four said, "When the facts warrant it, and the interest of speedy admin-
istration of justice, I frequently will make recommendations as described in question
3 [the prosecutor indicated in question three that he used all three practices by making
recommendations to the court]." Two of the questionnaires were removed from con-
sideration because of substantial inconsistencies in the answers and comments which
prevented any conclusions from being drawn. The responses from five letters are
included in the total figure of eighty-one responses. Many of the prosecutors re-
sponding to question two indicated that they would discuss plea arrangements only
with a defendant's counsel.
185The eleven prosecutors who indicated in question two that they do not plea
bargain are not included in the results of any question concerning plea bargaining.
Similarly, the one letter which indicated that the prosecutor probably plea bargained
is not included in the results of such questions since none of the specific questions
was answered.
186 The three types of practices tabulated were listed on the questionnaire form,
and the prosecutors were requested to rank the types in importance. The ranking
indicated that in general where promises of sentence recommendations were used, it
was the most important practice. As between the practices of acceptance of pleas
to lesser included offenses and dismissals of counts or other indictments, the former
was usually indicated as more important.
187 As to other less prevalent types of practices, some of which were mentioned
by prosecutors answering the questionnaire, see note 7 supra.
188 Some of the rules listed in the comments to the question include: approval
by the department head, bargain only with defense counsel, never accept a plea to
less than one-half of the counts in the indictment, no reductions in certain types of
cases, e.g., use of a deadly weapon and some narcotics cases, and no sentence recom-
mendations. One prosecutor listed the following rules: recommend parole for first
offenders, accept pleas only on most serious charges and dismiss others, generally
accept pleas to second degree murder except in the most aggravated cases, and refuse
to accept a plea to a lesser offense or recommend any penalty less than twenty-five
years imprisonment in armed robbery cases.
189 Several of these prosecutors indicated that in aggravated or unusual cases,
the department head must agree on the plea arrangement.
190 The factors tabulated were listed on the questionnaire and the prosecutors
were requested to rank them in importance.
191 The designations tabulated were listed on the questionnaire and the prosecutors
were requested to rank them in importance. Of the 56 prosecutors in the Definitely
Plea Bargain Group who checked "defendant's counsel" as a bargaining initiator, 32
of the 39 who ranked the initiators in importance, ranked "defendant's counsel" as
the most important.
.92 In each of the eleven answers, the designation checked was "defense counsel."
193 In each of the four answers, the designation checked was "defense counsel."
194 Several in this group indicated that they would discuss plea arrangements
with a defendant only if the defendant requested it. One prosecutor said he would
not discuss a possible plea arrangement if defense counsel was to be appointed.
195 Most of the "no" responses were emphatic. -
196 This prosecutor qualified his response by saying only if the defense counsel
approves.
197 Four of the "yes" responses indicated that the prosecutors often charged a
higher degree of murder in order to induce guilty pleas to a lesser included offense.
Several prosecutors said they only occasionally prepared such indictments. One
prosecutor stated, "it sometimes pays to load up on a particular defendant in order
to increase [one's] . . . bargaining position."
198 Several prosecutors commented that the judge should not be present at plea
bargaining sessions in order to preserve his impartiality and that time schedules of
almost all judges could not provide for such participation.
199 Many of the "no" answer comments indicated that judges are usually aware
of the plea arrangements because of the manner of disposition of the cases.
200 The following are illustrative of the comments to this question: a guilty plea
demonstrates partial rehabilitation, avoidance of a sham defense deserves consideration,
and guilty pleas are an expedient manner of disposing of criminal cases.
[Vol.l12:865
